John Ainsworth, writing as the provincial commissioner of Nyanza Province in 1916, was one of the first colonial administrators to become concerned with the "problem." He worried that "detribalized" askaris would degenerate into a class of "professional beggars and hangers on" after spending their disability or war gratuities, and proposed hiring them as caretakers, headmen or watchmen for European farms and businesses. In certain limited cases, he envisioned land grants to "detribalized native" veterans or their widows.5 Since they were not part of a "traditional" African community, the Sudanese were not assigned a native reserve," nor were they under the jurisdiction of the "native tribunals." As these mechanisms of indirect rule and "tribal law" were unworkable, Ainsworth proposed settling the Sudanese near administrative stations where they would pay a nominal rent, and be supervised by district commissioners (DCs) with the power to evict them if they became unruly. Ainsworth was opposed to making the settlements too large because he correctly foresaw that they had the potential to become ungovernable permanent communities: "The fewer the number of detribalized people we are required to deal with eventually the better." Thus, he proposed a scheme where only disabled veterans would have the security of rent-free tenure, while healthy men and their families would become a class of rent-and tax-paying tenants residing at the will of the colonial state, subject to eviction at any time.6
It is against this background that Kibera must be considered. In 1911, the KAR's training ground was informally settled by survivors and widows of the Sudanese askaris of "B" and "C" Companies of 3 KAR. They were soon joined by other Sudanese veterans who had been evicted from their settlements near Machakos and Kiambu that same year. Kibera's proximity to the 3 KAR barracks appears to have been the main factor in drawing the Sudanese to the area. By 1912, the KAR officially sanctioned their residency by permitting 291 Sudanese askaris to live in what came to be known as "the KAR shambas." Only veterans with more than twelve years of service were eligible for "shamba passes," which allowed them to live rent free as a form of unofficial pension (those with nine years service were already eligible for a lifetime exemption from either the hut or poll tax). but in Kibera the military connections of the Sudanese safeguarded them from summary expulsion.
Unfortunately for the Sudanese, the King's African Rifles was a fickle and unreliable patron. Since KAR officers were limited to a maximum of two tours of two to three years, officers who understood and respected them were gradually replaced by new men who knew nothing of their past exploits. Moreover, the contraction of the KAR during the lean economic years between the two World Wars meant that the army saw the continued military administration of Kibera as an unjustifiable drain of manpower and funding. In 1926, the original KAR residency passes of the Sudanese were withdrawn by order of the commander of 3 KAR. By 1928, the Kenyan government and the KAR agreed that no more permits would be issued, and the plots of deceased residents would not be reallocated to other Sudanese veterans. Kenya's senior commissioners, meeting in the same year, decided that "detribalized natives squatting on the KAR Reserve" had no claim to special privileges. They optimistically declared that the Sudanese would be moved when the operational headquarters and barracks of 3 KAR was shifted from Nairobi to Meru in 1928, thereby rendering further military supervision of the community impossible.11 Thus, the Kiberan Sudanese were quietly placed under civil administration for the first time during their residency in Kenya.
Kibera Under Civil Administration, 1928-1939
The withdrawal of military authority was to prove more problematical than the Kenyan authorities ever imagined. Although it was now under formal civil control, Kibera still lacked both direct European administration and any form of "traditional" authority through whom the government could rule indirectly. The closest approximation was a poorly respected unofficial headman who had no legislative authority or coercive force at his disposal. Kibera was an administrative grey area in which the poll tax was not collected until 1946.12 The area therefore became extremely attractive to large numbers of non-Sudanese Africans who were drawn to Nairobi in search of work and opportunity -many of whom were forced to survive through burglary, bootlegging and prostitution. In 1932, the Carter Land Commission recorded that half of the householders of Kibera were women, many of whom were described as prostitutes, and that two-thirds of the population of the settlement were Kenya-born Africans rather than immigrant Sudanese.13 Moreover, to the frustration of the civil administration, Kibera also drew large numbers of veterans from other Sudanese settlements in East Africa, who were technically illegal residents because they lacked an original KAR "shamba pass." Thus, the withdrawal of the military Cantonment Regulations actually brought about an increase in the crime and disorder associated with Kibera.
As a civil responsibility, Kibera now came under the jurisdiction of the DC of Nairobi, whose main goal for the settlement was to stem the influx of nonSudanese Africans by either moving the community away from Nairobi or reorganizing it along more disciplined lines. In 1930, the DC considered a site in the Maasai Reserve near Ngong as an alternative settlement for the Sudanese veterans of Kibera. The Sudanese were generally receptive to plans for their relocation to good agricultural land close to Nairobi, and were amenable to a move to an area known as Kasura located between the Kiserian and Mbagathi Rivers. Unfortunately, the main stumbling block to relocation were the Maasai, still angry and distrustful of the government due to their extensive land losses earlier in the century, and simply unwilling to surrender the territory in question.14 The area around Mbagathi Township, in what was then known as the Nairobi Commonage, was also available for settlement in 1931. Unfortunately, a government soil survey conducted in 1931 found that most of the area's 1,500 acres were poorly watered, and thus unsuitable for farming.15 Furthermore, while not part of the Maasai Reserve, it was coveted by a much more powerful interest group. In 1931, the game warden of Nairobi protested the proposal to settle the Sudanese on the Nairobi Commonage because it was the only part of the Southern Game Reserve that did not belong to the Maasai, and as such it was the only practical site in the entire region for a game sanctuary. He argued that: Nairobi has a priceless and unique possession in the proximity to its centre of the most remarkable pieces of game country in the world. Indeed I have not seen, nor heard of, any area of the country so small in extent which contains a variety and abundance of animal life at all comparable to that found in the Nairobi Commonage. .. Natives, whether detribalized or not, have children; they also have, or hope to have, cattle, sheep, goats; many will doubtless want to make gardens: in short they introduce a variety of factors making for the spoilation of nature. .... Indeed I suppose that less than five percent of [Nairobi's] inhabitants have ever taken the trouble to penetrate a couple of miles into the Game Reserve beyond the aerodome. Game is still too much of a common-place, and is taken for granted. It will not always be so.16
Thus, the preservation of wildlife won out over the interests of the Kiberan Sudanese, and the Nairobi Commonage is known today as Nairobi National Park.
With the failure of these relocation plans, the government turned instead to the reorganization of Kibera. In 1931, the DC of Nairobi, E.B. Hosking, accompanied by the municipal Native affairs officer and the police inspector of Kilimani, held a baraza (meeting) with the Sudanese of Kibera. Kiberans holding legal residence permits received round metal door plates stamped with the letters "KAR" and numbered from 1-350. Hosking, although sympathetic to the plight of the Sudanese, declared residency rights in Kibera could not be inherited, but blood relatives would be permitted to settle in the community so long as no additional houses were built. All other residents without legal permits were to be evicted, and Hosking warned that a criminal conviction of any legal resident would also result in expulsion. The Sudanese reaction to these measures was defiant. Many rejected the registration discs as an insulting form of "kipande."17 Although possessing no formal legal deed or title, they argued the KAR had given Kibera to them and their descendents in perpetuity.
Unlike many of the DCs of Nairobi who were to succeed him, Hosking was conscious of the military debt owed to the Sudanese ex-askari:
His attitude at present though truculent and difficult is understandable. He thinks that Government persuaded him to remain here and make his home here as a loyal reservist and now when he is no longer needed as a soldier he is turned adrift into the world, hundreds of miles from his home.18 However, this relatively sympathetic attitude did not mean that Hosking was willing to fight to preserve Kibera. In 1931, he wrote to the commissioner for local government that "their reserve is in the wrong zone of the town for Native Their victory, however, was short lived. In 1932 and 1933, the "Kibera problem" was brought before the Kenya Land Commission, which considered the many land claims that had sprung up from the European occupation of the Central Highlands and the imposition of "Native reserves." The Kenyan government hoped the Commission would provide legal sanction for the removal of the settlement, and marshalled a great deal of evidence to show that the Sudanese had no title to the land and were a source of crime and disorder. Hosking's successor, C.H. Adams, told the Committee that "land around big towns is much too valuable to start 'native farms' adjoining them," and argued that the Sudanese were in fact "tenants at the will of the Crown" who could be evicted by the Minister of Lands at any time. Adams maintained that Sudanese veterans received a discharge gratuity in cash payment, and not legal title to Kibera. Colonel R. Wilkinson, the commander of the KAR's Northern Brigade and the highest ranking officer in the colony, did nothing to defend the Sudanese. He favored relocating Kibera because the Sudanese no longer enlisted in appreciable numbers. Captain B.F. Montgomery, the adjutant of 5 KAR, was more sympathetic. He argued that only the second generation of Sudanese who failed to fulfill the residency requirement through military service should be evicted. The older ex-askaris, he argued, should still be allowed to spend their final days in Kibera.20
The Sudanese themselves were allowed to offer testimony to the Committee, and in a joint memorandum repeated their claim that Kibera was their pension. This hearkened back to an older practice in the Sudan. Under the institution of military slavery old soldiers were given land in recognition of their service, and Sudanese veterans of the KAR logically expected the same treatment. While a formidable group of European witnesses testified against the Sudanese, the Commission declined to sanction their outright eviction. It did find that "... there is nothing whatever to support the contention of the Sudanese that the whole area was given to them as a reserve forever. They were merely given permission to live there." However, it qualified this statement by noting they were also owed certain obligations:
We consider that Government had a clear duty to these ex-askaris either to repatriate them or to find accommodation for them. They were told that they might make their homes at Kibera and in our judgement they ought not to be moved without receiving suitable land elsewhere and compensation for disturbance, and we consider that a similar obligation exists in respect of their widows, or sons who are already householders in Kibera.24
The Sudanese were expected to die out slowly, and their presence could be tolerated until old age removed them. The Commission denied the Sudanese the right to build more houses in Kibera as it accepted the argument that the settlement had become "useless" as a military recruiting ground. Such houses were to be destroyed after the death of veterans and widows, with the second generation Sudanese eventually moved to the Muslim neighborhood of Pumwani. As Kibera's population shrank, it was to be concentrated in a smaller corer of the settlement, with full compensation paid for any houses that had to be removed to do so. If relocation was necessary, the Commission felt the government had an obligation to settle the Sudanese on good land within easy reach of Nairobi. It recommended that an area be leased for them from the Maasai between the Kiserian and Mbagathi rivers. The non-Sudanese who owned 320 of the 571 houses in Kibera were to receive no special treatment in resettlement, and the Commission singled them out as the primary cause of disorder in the community. They were to receive the "bare cost" of their houses and crops, and were to move to Pumwani or their home reserves.25
The Kenya Land Commission's recommendations pleased neither the civil administration nor the Sudanese. The Sudanese claim to Kibera was repudiated, but the government was not given sanction to summarily evict them. Moreover, the optimistic hope that some order could be imposed on the settlement until the exaskaris conveniently died of old age proved to be entirely unfounded. Native-born Kenyan Africans continued to see Kibera as a sanctuary from colonial authority. Since the veterans did not have the will or the ability to impose order on the community, complaints about Kibera continued to mount throughout the 1930s.26 The Sudanese acknowledged that illegal brewing of "Nubian gin" did go on in Kibera, but defended it as the only support for old women of the community. Major W. Gerald Edward, a former officer with 3 KAR, wrote to the chief Native commissioner in 1936 to explain that the Sudanese were forced into illegal activities because they were denied service pensions.27 These arguments, however, carried little weight with the civil administration, which considered increased police raids to be the only means of dealing with crime in Kibera.
The Sudanese complained bitterly about the conduct of the police, and charged that their women were sometimes dragged naked from their beds in the middle of the night by the constables. A 1933 petition from the "Nubians of the KAR Shambas" to the commissioner of police asked for permission to police their own community:
We respectfully submit, that having served the Empire in many wars, as our records will shew, and proved our loyalty to Government, we are, as a body, entitled to some consideration in matters of this sort, and that it is grossly unjust that the majority should suffer for the misdemeanors of a few, who, if we were given the necessary powers we ourselves would control.28 This request highlighted the ambiguous position of the Sudanese in Kenya. As "detribalized Natives" and former servants of the government, they were able to secure a privileged position in Kibera, but, on the other hand, their "detribalized status" also meant that they lacked officially recognized "traditional authorities" through which to control their community. The commissioner of police, on the other hand, considered elective eviction of criminals and women of "undesirable character" to be the best remedy, and proposed to give Kibera its own "Native council" with the highest ranking Sudanese veteran as headman. . . the recommendation is that the ex-askari and his wife and family should be permitted to remain undisturbed until the death of both the ex-askari and his wife, but obviously this should not be read as meaning a decrepit, old askari with possibly a grown-up and married family, on his death should be succeeded in occupation by that grown-up family and a wife or wives whom he may have recently married and who might be a very young woman, in some cases younger than the so called family.33
Sutcliffe and the rest of the civil administration were not willing to take any chances; Kibera would die a natural death as its only legal inhabitants passed away.
The Sudanese, however, were not without their own allies and resources. They sent appeals for aid to their former officers, many of whom were now influential men.34 Moreover, the Kiberans had the additional advantage of support from some settlers and former KAR officers who had settled in the colony. In April, 1936, the Sunday Post's "Plain Speaking" column laid the blame for disorder in Kibera at the doorstep of the civil administration, which had allowed This gradual shift away from the army as the sole vocation of young Sudanese failed to weaken the Sudanese claim to preferential treatment for their long service. In 1935 Crown Counsel Theodore Wallace blocked the DC of Nairobi's attempts to move the Sudanese to a new "concentrated" settlement on the grounds they had been given written permission to reside in Kibera at the "will of the Crown." He noted that although their "shamba passes" implied they could be removed at any time, the Sudanese who had lived in Kibera for twenty years had been given to believe that their residency was a reward for military service, and had therefore never been warned they were subject to eviction. Wallace wrote: "to turn them off at this juncture without finding them a home elsewhere or without compensation is in the Attorney General's opinion if not illegal at any rate most inequitable while politically it might raise a storm of protest both at home and in the their houses and permits; and in one case a Kamba "housekeeper"caring for a senile veteran while using the house to brew illegal liquor.57 The quasi-legal status of these residents made it difficult for the government to evict them.
While the accuracy of the overall population figures for non-Sudanese in
Kibera is open to question given their unofficial and technically illegal status, the civil administration was certain the community of "detribalized Natives" exempted from the rules governing the "Native reserves" was primarily responsible for disorder in the location. The 1944 Economic and Social Survey of Kibera blamed "undesirables" who took advantage of Kibera's "extra-municipal status" for most of the crime. The survey concluded that "it is tolerably certain that whatever the character of the house holders any settlement with the material characteristics of Kibera -on the borders of a large town, extensive, scattered and away from the eyes of authority, would tend to attract bad characters."58 These "bad characters" drew the attention of the European community in 1944 when two Africans were murdered on the Royal Nairobi Golf Course (a section of Kibera excised from the location in the late 1930's), causing the club committee to worry about the safety of its members.59 The Sudanese were not directly blamed for these sorts of incidents, nor were they held directly responsible for the widespread prostitution in Kibera. Kitching considered they merely exploited the housing shortage by renting out rooms to prostitutes from other ethnic groups. In 1948, the DC of Nairobi even accused the European community of contributing to the problem by "parking" their children's ayahs (nurses or nannies) in Kibera for lack of housing elsewhere.60
While most of Kibera's poorest residents were not Sudanese, evidence indicates that by the 1940's, the Sudanese community was becoming increasingly divided along age and class lines. Many older Sudanese veterans and their widows, lacking families to take care of them, slid into poverty. By 1945, the superintendent of Kibera estimated there were at least fifty-two destitute elderly Sudanese who needed some kind of government assistance.61 Without old age pensions, many had little alternative but to take advantage of the lucrative illegal opportunities presented by Kibera. The Kibera Survey found that most of the Sudanese brewing We have allowed these conditions to develop without taking any corresponding steps to provide an economic outlet for the special needs of these people. We are now reaping the evil effects of our neglect and no amount of abusive comment or punitive action will substitute for the economic self-sufficiency which had been created in Kibera by this form of illicit trade.62
The majority of the Kibera Sudanese, however, achieved a measure of prosperity from their military experience, education, proximity to Nairobi and unique status as Kibera's only legal residents. Their KAR "shamba permits" gave them de facto title to substantial amounts of valuable agricultural land, which they in turn made available to the local African community in exchange for rent in cash or in kind. There are a number of natives of other tribes than Sudanese who are claimed as adopted sons and daughters by the regular inhabitants.
[They] are very difficult to identify as they have been given Mohamedan names. The object of this adoption seems to be to procure a husband for the women and obtain a dowry or to reap the benefit of prostitution by these women. Men so adopted are hidden under this camouflage in order to run butchers shops or graze cattle in the location, for which they no doubt pay their adopted parents. had actually improved in Kibera since the rebellion began, it advocated a strict policy of "demolition, concentration, reconstruction and compensation." Major General W. R. N. Hinde, director of operations during Mau Mau, argued Kibera was an "anachronism," best dealt with during the Emergency rather than after it. Thus, the extra-legal powers granted to the colonial civil administration during Mau Mau offered the last and best chance for it to impose its will on Kibera.96 Yet even so the Sudanese remained able to exploit the Emergency: Mau Mau was another opportunity to claim the rewards of loyal service. In 1953, they requested that attendance at the new Kibera government school be limited to Sudanese to avoid "contamination by subversive propaganda."97 While they had made money from Kikuyu renters and sharecroppers, the Sudanese landlords did little to protest their eviction during the Emergency, as the Kikuyu in Kibera were quickly replaced by other ethnic groups from western Kenya.
In the mid-1950's, the civil administration proposed to solve the Kibera problem through municipal legislation. It abandoned attempts to evict the Sudanese and drafted new measures to transform Kibera from a "Sudanese Ghetto" into a planned settlement open to all. As plans for Nairobi's new Woodley Estate included parts of Kibera, the government proposed that the location be absorbed into the city itself where municipal ordinances would provide the legal sanction to manage the community. Yet the Nairobi City Council refused to accept responsibility for Kibera until its substandard houses were demolished and the occupants compensated. In other words, the city council was unwilling to assume responsibility for one of the colonial administration's longest running problems. The Kibera Sudanese were uncertain as to whether to oppose the new development plans. While Kibera's inclusion in Nairobi would have effectively ended their agricultural activities, it also offered much needed and long-desired improvements in education, medical care and basic public utilities. Some Sudanese merchants cooperated with the new "African (Kibera Settlement Area) Rules" which improved overall sanitary conditions. This new spirit of cooperation, however, failed to end police raids. In September 1958, the Sudanese Association wrote to the commissioner of police to complain that the General Services Unit (GSU) raided the settlement three to four times per night during a two-week period. When the Sudanese protested the sacking of their homes and the molestation of their women, the GSU askaris told them to go back to the Sudan.100 These incidents illustrate the increasingly tenuous position of the Kiberans in the late 1950's. While the opening of the political process to Africans prevented the colonial administration from imposing its will unilaterally, it was unlikely the soon-to-be-enfranchised African majority would extend special privileges of residence and tenure to a community which owed its position to its role in helping to establish colonial rule. 
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